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Romania and Bulgaria both joined the EU in 2007 and became subject to an ad hoc tool, the
‘Cooperation and Veriﬁcation Mechanism’ (CVM), which was created by the European Commission
to evaluate the progress of the two countries. Today, however, there is a growing gap between the
two states: while Commission oﬃcials have suggested the possibility of Romania graduating out of
the mechanism soon, there has been very little progress recorded in Bulgaria. Eli Gateva argues
that questions about how and when the CVM will end have overshadowed debates about its
eﬀectiveness, and that the recent worrying developments in Poland and Hungary show that a more
comprehensive approach to the rule of law is needed.
When Bulgaria and Romania became members of the European Union in January 2007, the European Commission
set up a Cooperation and Veriﬁcation Mechanism (CVM) in order to evaluate their progress in addressing a number
of outstanding issues in the areas of judicial reform, the ﬁght against corruption and organised crime. Almost a
decade after accession and much to the chagrin of politicians in Soﬁa and Bucharest, the mechanism is still in
place. As Bulgaria and Romania are the only EU member states to have been subjected to this unprecedented form
of monitoring, the two countries have continuously raised concerns about the emergence of EU double standards.
The mechanism provided for the activation of safeguard clauses included in the Accession Treaty if Soﬁa and/or
Bucharest failed to make suﬃcient progress. However, the applicability of the sanctions expired at the end of 2009
(three years after accession). There were discussions in the Commission over whether to link the removal of the
CVM with Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession to the Schengen Area, but the opinions within the college diverged
and the idea was abandoned. Nevertheless, Germany and the Netherlands have linked the two issues and blocked
their entry into Schengen.
The 15th set of CVM reports, published on 27
January 2016, indicates a growing gap between the
two countries. Although the Commission noted that
reforms in Romania should be consolidated further, it
praised continued progress and conﬁrmed that ‘the
track record of the key judicial and integrity
institutions to address high-level corruption has
remained impressive’. The report painted a diﬀerent
picture of the developments in Bulgaria. The
Commission acknowledged that new strategies on
judicial reform and the ﬁght against corruption
‘represent a detailed blueprint for action’. However, it
stressed that ‘in key areas of judicial governance the
eﬀorts of the Bulgarian authorities still lack
determination’ and drew attention to ‘the continued
lack of a solid track record in high-level cases on
corruption and organised crime’.
More than nine years after its accession to the Union,
it is becoming increasingly evident that reforms in
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Romania have started to bear fruit. South of the border, Bulgaria is yet to translate reforms into tangible progress.
The EU has carefully avoided the question of a possible decoupling of Bucharest and Soﬁa, but in February the
President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Junker, openly conﬁrmed for the ﬁrst time that: ‘If Romania is
ready before our Bulgarian friends, it is obvious that the mechanism would be terminated’. Although a decision about
the CVM is unlikely to be made before the publication of the next reports in January 2017, Juncker’s remark has sent
important, but clearly very diﬀerent messages to the political elites in both countries.
The question of how and when the CVM will end have overshadowed debates about its eﬀectiveness. Nevertheless,
it is clear that the relevance of the mechanism is neither limited to the areas of judicial reform and the ﬁght against
corruption, nor to domestic politics in Bulgaria and Romania. The post-accession monitoring has shaped the revision
of EU enlargement policy. The launch of the New Approach to Accession Negotiations ﬁrmly placed chapter 23
(Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) at the heart of the accession
process. The idea of a ‘CVM for all’ has also inspired the development of the EU Justice Scoreboard, EU Anti-
Corruption Report and the Rule of Law Mechanism. The Union’s reaction to recent developments in Poland reveals
the limitations of the existing instruments and demonstrates the need for a more comprehensive approach to the
protection of the rule of law and fundamental rights at the EU level.
In the run up to the tenth anniversary of the unprecedented creation of the mechanism, the diverging trajectories of
Bucharest and Soﬁa illustrate the uneven impact of the Union. The impressive track record of the National Anti-
Corruption Directorate (DNA) and National Integrity Agency (ANI) in Romania also highlights the relevance of
institutions. However, a strong civil society is crucial for sustainable change, as political elites interested in
maintaining the status quo can sabotage reforms. Romania’s progress conﬁrms that the EU can play an important
role in driving reforms even after accession, but local ownership is indispensable. The question now is whether
Soﬁa can catch up with Bucharest.
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